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CHARITY LAW, THE ADVANCEMENT 
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WILL THE UNITED KINGDOM BE THE 
ANSWER TO NEW ZEALAND'S 
PRAYERS? 
Juliet Chevalier-Watts* 
The law of charity and religion has an ancient relationship and religion, for charity law purposes, 
recognises a plethora of belief systems. However, for a religion to be recognised at law in New 
Zealand and in the United Kingdom it must have public benefit, whether that is a presumed 
requirement or to be shown expressly. This requirement of public benefit has generated much 
debate over the decades, in parliaments, in courts and in academia. This article considers the very 
real issues associate with public benefit and the advancement of religion in charity law and asks 
whether the contemporary approach of the United Kingdom with regard to the removal of the 
presumption of public benefit would provide a more certain legal path for New Zealand courts and 
charitable bodies. 
I INTRODUCTION TO RELIGION AND CHARITY 
The contribution of religion and its various organisations to building institutional infrastructures 
and shaping societies should not be underestimated.1 Religion has been said to be at the heart of 
civil society in England and Wales,2 as well as laying many of the foundations of the present health 
and education systems in Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and other countries.3 Religion 
can also be said to be of great importance in the legal environment. For instance, it may offer 
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1  Kerry O'Halloran "Charity and Religion: International charity reform outcomes and the choices for 
Australia" (2011) 17(2) Third Sector Review 29 at 30. 
2  Debra Morris "Charities and the Big Society: a doomed coalition?" (2012) 32 LS 132 at 132. 
3  O'Halloran, above n 1, at 30–31. 
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protection in plural societies to minority or unpopular religious communities that may require 
particular protection, and it is widely accepted, although not universally, 4  that religion has a 
beneficial impact on the community thus religious pursuits should be encouraged by law "since they 
promote the interests of society".5 
The history of charity law – including the law pertaining to religion and religious organisations 
recognised as being charitable at law – is ancient. The earliest reported case relating to charitable 
purpose dates from 300 AD, with some of the earliest charities being recorded as medieval schools, 
hospitals, almshouses, and the support of the Church. History shows that gifts to religion and 
religious purposes were only charitable if for the Catholic Church; that was until Henry VIII 
established the Church of England and then any support for religion or religious purposes falling 
outside of the newly established Church of England was said to be for superstitious use or illegal.6 
Clearly, however, society and law has seen a more progressive and tolerant approach to religion, 
with the acceptance, albeit gradually, of many other religions. Legally recognised religions within a 
number of Common Law jurisdictions include: Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Scientology, 
Catholicism and Presbyterianism.7 In terms of a purpose being recognised legally as advancing 
religion, the criteria in Australasia is twofold. First, there must be a belief in a supernatural being, 
thing or principle, and secondly, there must be an acceptance of canons of conduct that give effect to 
that belief.8 In order to advance a religion, an organisation or purpose must take positive steps to 
promote or spread the message that will support or sustain the religious message amongst mankind.9 
The Charity Commission of England and Wales notes that the definition of religion is characterised 
by:10  
 the belief in a god (or gods) or goddess (or goddesses), or supreme being, or divine or 
transcendental being or entity or spiritual principle, which is the object or focus of the religion 
(referred to in this guidance as "supreme being or entity");  
  
4  Andrew Iwobi "Out with the old, in with the new: religion, charitable status and the Charities Act 2006" 
(2009) 29 LS 619 at 621. 
5  At 621. 
6  Francesca Quint and Peter Hodkin "The Development of Tolerance and Diversity in the Treatment of 
Religion in Charity Law" (2007) 10(2) CL & PR 1 at 3. 
7  At 4–5. 
8  Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 120 at [17]. 
9  United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of England v Holborn Borough Council [1957] 
1 WLR 1080 (CA) at 1090. 
10  The Advancement of Religion for the Public Benefit (Charity Commission (UK), December 2011) at Annexe 
A. 
 CHARITY LAW, THE ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGION AND PUBLIC BENEFIT 387 
 the belief system involves a relationship between the believer and the supreme being or entity by 
showing worship of, reverence for or veneration of the supreme being or entity;  
 the belief system has a degree of cogency, cohesion, seriousness and importance;  
 the belief system promotes an identifiable positive, beneficial, moral or ethical framework. 
There must also be an advancement or promotion of the religion. Section 3(2)(a) of the Charities 
Act 2011 of England and Wales also notes that "religion" includes a belief in more than one god and 
also no belief in a god.11 
For Common Law jurisdictions, the law governing the relationship between charity and religion, 
in essence, finds its roots in the Statute of Charitable Uses Act 1601, or the Statute of Elizabeth, 
specifically the Preamble, which set out a non-exhaustive list of purposes that were considered 
charitable. The Statute has long since been repealed. Modern day courts still refer to this Preamble 
as a method of determining the charitable nature of a purpose. The next important stage in the law 
governing charity and law, including religion, occurred in the case of Commissioners for Special 
Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel, where Lord Mcnaghten infamously set out what have become the 
four heads of charity: the relief of poverty, the advancement of religion, the advancement of 
education and any other purposes beneficial to the community. 12  These heads of charity are 
captured in New Zealand under s 5 of the Charities Act 2005. As to why advancement of religion is 
one of the four Pemsel heads, it was explained in Liberty Trust v Charities Commission that, in 
reference to the Australian case of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne v Lawlor, it was 
because the "law has found a public benefit in the promotion of religion as an influence upon human 
conduct".13 
The Charities Act 2005 (NZ) and the Charities Act 2006 (UK) – the latter now consolidated in 
the Charities Act 2011 (UK) – provide that an entity will only be charitable if its purposes are 
charitable.14 It is long-established that for any trust to be recognised as legally charitable, it must not 
only fall within one of the four heads of charity,15 it must also satisfy the public benefit test. Where 
trusts may fall within one or more of the first three heads of charity, it is accepted that the public 
  
11  Charities Act 2011 (UK), s 3(2)(a)(i)–(ii). 
12  Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 (HL) at 583. 
13  Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne v Lawlor (1934) 51 CLR 1 at 33 as cited in Liberty Trust v 
Charities Commission [2011] 3 NZLR 68 (HC) at [53]. See generally Juliet Chevalier-Watts Charity Law in 
New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2014) at ch 5.  
14  Charities Act 2005, s 5; and Charities Act 2011 (UK), s 4. 
15  The Charities Act 2011 (UK) now recognises 13 heads of charity, with advancement of religion remaining 
one of these: at s 3(1)(c). 
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benefit element is presumed, except until recently in England and Wales,16 unless that presumption 
is rebutted. Charitable purposes falling within the fourth head, that of any other purposes beneficial 
to the community, are not presumed to be for the public benefit, and that benefit must be set out 
expressly in New Zealand. 
Not only is there a lack of a statutory definition of public benefit, but there is also an absence of 
a straightforward or comprehensive definition in case law. This has led, inevitably perhaps, to 
varying legal interpretations.17 The scope of uncertainty of public benefit and its presumption has 
been apparent for centuries, and this scope of uncertainty is demonstrated throughout this article, 
both in United Kingdom and New Zealand. The New Zealand Government agreed to conduct a 
review of the Charities Act 2005, which included undertaking a review of the charitable purpose 
definition to be completed by 2015, but it was recently announced that the review has been 
postponed.18 In light of this postponement, and a future review, this article considers the very real 
issues associated with the presumption of public benefit and considers whether New Zealand should 
consider, as part of the future review, whether the United Kingdom's removal of the presumption of 
public benefit would be the panacea for the New Zealand public benefit ills and, if so, would it be a 
preferable path for New Zealand to consider in order to provide more legal certainty in relation to 
the advancement of religion. 
This article does not seek to provide an exhaustive list of all the religious purposes cases, instead 
it evaluates a number of significant cases that illustrate some of the key issues surrounding the 
presumption of public benefit with regard to the advancement of religion.  
II PUBLIC BENEFIT 
It would be fair to say that the notion of "public benefit" has "generated lively parliamentary, 
legal and journalistic debate in recent years, not least in relation to … the merits or otherwise of 
religious organisations".19 This article will explore just some of these debates in endeavouring to 
answer the original proposition.  
The requirement of public benefit has two overlapping requirements. First, "the persons eligible 
to participate in the religious purposes must be an inclusive, public group, rather than an exclusive, 
  
16  The Preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth 1601 provided a non-exhaustive list of charitable purposes, which 
were distilled in to the four heads of charity by Lord McNaghten in Pemsel, above n 12: the relief of 
poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of religion and any other purposes beneficial to the 
community not falling under any preceding head. A presumption of public benefit for all heads of charity 
was first removed by the Charities Act 2006 (UK).  
17  Mary Synge "A State of Flux in Public Benefit Across the UK, Ireland and Europe" (2013) 16 CL & PR 163 
at 164. 
18  Jo Goodhew "No review of the Charities Act at this time" (press release, 16 November 2012).  
19  Synge, above n 17, at 163. 
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private group".20 The actual number of persons choosing to take advantage of the purposes is not of 
concern so long as, in principle, others may join.21 
The second requirement, which will be the focus of this article, is that the purposes of the 
religion or organisation must benefit society generally. Prima facie, these requirements appear 
straightforward, however, in reality:22 
The concept of public benefit is intangible and nebulous; its effects can only be represented as variable 
and unpredictable. Imprecision has resulted in illogical and capricious decisions, sometimes impossible 
to reconcile. 
Indeed, the notion of this two-limbed test that has been developed by the courts over hundreds 
of years has not always been referred to consistently. It has sometimes been referred to as "the first 
and second test alone, depending on which was in issue before the court",23 or sometimes a court 
would refer to charitable status generally,24 "or synonymously with purposes of general public 
utility or, more broadly, with the fourth head of charity".25  
More recently the Upper Tribunal in R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission 
noted that courts have "adopted an incremental and somewhat ad hoc approach in relation to what 
benefits the community",26 and that there has never been a comprehensive attempt to define that 
which is of public benefit. However, what the Tribunal did do was discern from the jurisprudence 
that there are two related aspects of public benefit. The first is that the nature of the purpose must be 
of benefit to the community. This the Tribunal refers to as "public benefit in the first sense".27 This 
equates to the second requirement of public benefit, to which this article has just referred. The 
second aspect of public benefit noted by the Tribunal is that "those who may benefit from carrying 
  
20  Pauline Ridge "Religious Charitable Status and Public Benefit in Australia" (2011) 35 MULR 1071 at 1074 
referring to Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd [1951] AC 297 (HL). 
21  Inland Revenue Commissioners v Baddeley [1955] AC 572, as cited in Ridge, above n 20, at 1074. 
22  GHL Fridman "Charities and Public Benefit" (1953) 31 Can Bar Rev 537 at 539 as cited in Jean Warburton 
"Charities and Public Benefit – From Confusion to Light?" (2008) 10(3) CL & PR at 2. 
23  Synge, above n 17, at 165 referring to Oppenheim, above n 20 (citations omitted). 
24  Synge, above n 18, at 165 referring to Re Hummeltenberg [1923] 1 Ch 237 at 240. 
25  Synge, above n 17, at 165 referring respectively to Townley v Bedwell (1801) 6 Ves Jun 194, 31 ER 1008 
and National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31 (HL) at 42 and 47 (citations omitted).   
26  R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch 214 (UT (Tax)) at [44]. 
27  At [44]. 
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out of the purpose must be sufficiently numerous"28 and identifiable as being a section of the 
public.29   
Therefore, "'[p]ublic benefit' is a term which deserves to be taken seriously",30 and in order to 
understand the issues associated with public benefit, and in particular the second requirement of 
public benefit, it is necessary to consider some of the key jurisprudence over the centuries.  
In the 18th century case, Jones v Williams, the Lord Chancellor noted that charity was "a gift to 
a general public use, which extends to the poor as well as to the rich".31 The key to the Statute of 
Elizabeth was that of public benefit,32 and whilst there may have been no explicit reference to 
public benefit prior to the case of Pemsel, this is explained as follows:33 
The explanation for the dearth of explicit reference to public benefit before Pemsel seems to be that, 
until the end of the Victorian era, public benefit was implicit in the legal meaning of charity, so that a 
charitable purpose was necessarily a purpose for public benefit. 
Therefore, "a trust, in order to be charitable, must be of [a] public character".34 This then 
suggests that the concept of public benefit has been inherent in charities for centuries35 and "indeed 
explains equity's particular tenderness for charitable trusts".36  
Interestingly, whilst the advancement of religion is legally recognised as one of the four heads 
of charity, it may come as some surprise that the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth made no 
explicit reference to the advancement of religion. The closest it came to such a charitable purpose 
was the repair of churches.37 This exclusion can perhaps be explained by understanding the secular 
  
28  At [44]. 
29  See also Oppenheim, above n 20. 
30  Synge, above n 17, at 163. 
31  Jones v Williams (1767) Amb 651 at 652, 27 ER 422 at 422 as cited in Michael Gousmett "The History of 
Charitable Purpose Tax Concessions in New Zealand: Part 1" (2013) 13 NZJTLP 139 at 139. 
32  Gousmett, above n 32, at 139 referring to Gareth Jones History of the Law of Charity 1532–1827 
(Cambridge University Press, London, 1969) at 27. 
33  Peter Luxton "Public benefit and charities: The impact of the Charities Bill on independent schools and 
private hospitals" (1 March 2006) Lancaster University Law School <www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/law> at 3 as 
cited in Gousmett, above n 31, at 140. 
34  Jean Warburton, Debra Morris and NF Riddle Tudor on Charities (9th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2003) at 7 as cited in Gousmett, above n 31, at 139. See also Jones, above n 33, at 22–52.  
35  Gousmett, above n 31, at 139 referring to Luxton, above n 33. 
36  Luxton, above n 33, as cited in Gousmett, above n 31, at 139. 
37  Chevalier-Watts, above n 13, at ch 5. 
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position of the period of Elizabeth I "and the desire of the Puritans to have a religion free of state 
interference", 38  although religion and charity have for centuries been closely associated. 
Nonetheless, that relationship has not been without its issues, and "history reflects the oftentimes 
difficult and shifting relationship between State and religion".39 Therefore religious purposes up 
until the 19th century "tended to be enforced on [a] distinct and separate jurisdictional basis"40 up 
until the decisions of firstly, Morice v Bishop of Durham, that tied the definition of charitable 
purposes to the spirit and intendment of the Preamble,41 and then in the later religious case of Cocks 
v Manners. Vice Chancellor Sir John Wickens noted:42 
It is said, in some of the cases, that religious purposes are charitable, but that can only be true as to 
religious services tending directly or indirectly towards the instruction or the edification of the public. 
Sir John Wickens did much to entrench the consideration of public benefit and the advancement 
of religion, when he "took the logical step of applying a public benefit, preamble-based 
methodology to religious charitable purpose".43 This notion of public benefit, and its presumption, 
has continued to this day, albeit with all its associated controversies, in particular "where the 
presence of public benefit from religious purposes has been contested, it has proved very difficult to 
pin down exactly what will constitute the requisite benefit".44 It is to the issue of the presumption of 
public benefit that we now turn. 
III THE PRESUMPTION OF PUBLIC BENEFIT 
It is, as mentioned earlier, a well-established principle that where a purpose falls under the first 
three heads of charity, then the court would presume that it would be charitable unless that 
presumption was rebutted. As a result, it is evident that in a number of cases concerning poverty, 
education and religion courts simply failed to address the element of public benefit, even if it might 
have been relevant.45 This was exemplified in Attorney-General v The Earl of Lonsdale, where a 
school for education of the sons of gentlemen was held to be charitable simply because schools of 
  
38  At ch 5 referring to Gino Dal Pont Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 2000) at 147. 
39  Chevalier-Watts, above n 13, at 168 referring to Ann O'Connell and Joyce Chia "The advancement (or 
retreat?) of religion as a head of charity: A historical perspective" in John Tiley (ed) Studies in the History 
of Tax Law (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2013) vol 6 at 369. 
40  Ridge, above n 20, at 1076. 
41  At 1076 referring to Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves Jun 399 at 405. 
42  Cocks v Manners (1871) LR 12 Eq 574 (Ch) at 585 as cited in Ridge, above n 20, at 1076. 
43  Ridge, above n 20, at 1077. 
44  At 1077. 
45  Warburton, above n 22, at 4. 
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learning were charitable.46 A further example is to be found in Re Watson, where a trust to publish 
and distribute works of a religious character were found to be charitable even though "there was 
evidence that the intrinsic value of the works was nil".47  
As a result therefore, the notion of the presumption of public benefit, and specifically in relation 
to the advancement of religion, has been fraught with difficulties and inconsistencies. Some of these 
difficulties stem from courts having to make a value judgement on whether the purpose in question 
provides a benefit or a harm to society. Such judgements will undoubtedly be influenced by the 
social values of the time, although courts have stated that an objective, as opposed to a subjective 
approach should be taken when determining the issue of public benefit.48 
Indeed, as Warburton notes, it is not difficult to find instances where individual judicial views 
"intrude into the assessment of the evidence".49 For instance, in National Anti-Vivisection Society, 
Lord Wright stated:50 
Harvey was only able to publish in 1628 his great work De motu cordis because he had been given deer 
from the Royal Park for purposes of vivisection. Countless millions have benefited from that discovery.  
I do not minimise the sufferings of the unfortunate deer. 
Harman LJ in the case of Re Pinion was clearly imposing his own view when he stated, rather 
forcefully: "I can conceive of no useful object to be served by foisting upon the public this mass of 
junk."51 It is accepted that Re Pinion concerned the advancement of education, but it is submitted 
that this is a useful example of the principle of public benefit and subjective judicial views. 
The recent English case of R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission offers a 
contemporary exploration of public benefit and its alleged presumption, and asserts that the 
presumption of public benefit actually may never have existed.52 It is acknowledged that this is a 
very lengthy case, and for the purposes of this article, I will concentrate on addressing public benefit 
  
46  At 4 referring to Attorney-General v The Earl of Lonsdale (1827) 1 Sim 105 (Ch). See also Brighton 
College v Marriott [1926] AC 192 (HL) at 204. 
47  Warburton, above n 22, at 4 referring to Re Watson [1973] 1 WLR 1472 (Ch). See also Peter M Smith 
"Religious Charities and the Charities Act 2006" (2007) 9(3) CL & PR 57. 
48  Warburton, above n 22, at 5–7 referring to Re Hummeltenberg, above n 24, at 242; National Anti-
Vivisection Society, above n 25, at 44; and Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426 (HL) at 456. 
49  Warburton, above n 22, at 5. 
50  National Anti-Vivisection Society, above n 25, at 48, as cited in Warburton, above n 22, at 5. 
51  Re Pinion [1965] Ch 85 at 107, as cited in Warburton, above n 22, at 5. 
52  R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission, above n 26. 
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in the second sense, as referred to earlier; in other words, that "the nature of the purpose itself must 
be such as to be a benefit to the community".53 
In relation to the issue of the non-existence of the presumption of public benefit, the Tribunal in 
R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission referred to, inter alia, the dictum of Lord 
Wright in National Anti-Vivisection Society.54 In the Tribunal's view with regard to the notion of the 
presumption of public benefit (in the second sense to which this article refers, although the Tribunal 
refers to it as the first sense) it was not until the decision of National Anti-Vivisection Society that 
there was any judicial statement that might be construed as referring to the presumption of public 
benefit, and even that case did not use the word "presumption" explicitly. Lord Wright, in the 
National Anti-Vivisection Society case noted:55 
The test of benefit to the community goes through the whole of Lord Macnaghten's classification, 
though as regards the first three heads, it may be prima facie assumed unless the contrary appears. 
The Tribunal was of the view that Lord Wright's approach was consistent with his learned 
colleague Lord Simonds, in the same case, where Lord Simonds stated:56 
I would rather say that, when a purpose appears broadly to fall within one of the familiar categories of 
charity, the court will assume it to be for the benefit of the community and, therefore, charitable, unless 
the contrary is shown, and further that the court will not be astute in such a case to defeat on doubtful 
evidence the avowed benevolent intention of a donor. But, my Lords, the next step is one that I cannot 
take. Where on the evidence before it the court concludes that, however well-intentioned the donor, the 
achievement of his object will be greatly to the public disadvantage, there can be no justification for 
saying that it is a charitable object. If and so far as there is any judicial decision to the contrary, it must, 
in my opinion, be regarded as inconsistent with principle and be overruled. This proposition is clearly 
stated by Russell J in In re Hummeltenberg, "In my opinion," he said, "the question whether a gift is or 
may be operative for the public benefit is a question to be answered by the court by forming an opinion 
upon the evidence before it." 
Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that a court, instead of making a presumption as to public 
benefit, will form its own view "on the evidence before it whether the trust is for the public 
benefit".57 It will do so, not by way of making an assumption, but rather by way of decision.58 In 
  
53  At [44].  
54  National Anti-Vivisection Society, above n 25. 
55  R (Independent Schools Council), above n 26, at [62] citing in part National Anti-Vivisection Society, above 
n 25, at 42. 
56  National Anti-Vivisection Society, above n 25, at 65–66 as cited in R (Independent Schools Council), above 
n 26, at [64]. See also Re Hummeltenberg, above n 24, at 242. 
57  R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission, above n 26. 
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other words, this approach is far from a presumption of public benefit in the usual sense, and as far 
as the Tribunal was aware, "the courts have never made any assumption about whether a purpose is 
directed to the public or a sufficient section of the public".59 Instead, a judge would determine the 
public benefit because the evidence before them is sufficient, in the "absence of any contrary 
evidence",60 to establish such a benefit.61 
Case law illustrates, therefore, that the notion of the presumption of public benefit generally has 
raised many issues over the years. For the purposes of this article, a number of cases will be 
considered that highlight the alleged judicial inconsistencies with regard to this doctrine in relation 
to religion and public benefit. Starting with English law, and then turning to New Zealand law, clear 
differences in application can be seen, differences that have been subject to criticism. As a result of 
such criticisms, the article then considers how the contemporary approach of the United Kingdom 
since the removal of the presumption of public benefit may provide a more consistent judicial 
approach in New Zealand. 
IV EARLY ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN RELIGION AND PUBLIC 
BENEFIT 
The notion of the presumption of public benefit, or its equivalent, appears to have been present 
in the common law for centuries, albeit not always in a manner that is explicit. It was evident that 
courts associated religion and charities as comfortable bed fellows, but there was no outward 
consideration in those early cases that the public would benefit from the purposes in question.62 For 
example, in the case of Attorney-General v Baxter, Sir Francis North struck down a trust for 
superstitious use, although he did say that there was charitable intention, and so should fall under 
the doctrine of cy-près.63  Harding argues that Baxter turned on two principles: first, that the 
superstitious use had to be struck down as being void; but secondly, that a trust for religious 
purposes was a charitable purpose. Therefore a trust for charitable purposes should be recognised as 
  
58  At [68]. 
59  At [69]. See also Attorney-General v The Charity Commission for England and Wales UTTCC 
FTC/84/2011, 20 February 2012. 
60  R (Independent Schools Council), above n 26, at [69]. 
61  At [69]. 
62  Matthew Harding "Trusts for Religious Purposes and the Question of Public Benefit" (2008) 71 MLR 159 at 
161. 
63  The equitable doctrine of cy-près permits a charitable trust to be modified in appropriate circumstances. It 
permits funds in a charitable trust, "where the intended purpose of the trust had become impossible or 
impracticable, to be applied by the Court to objects that were as near as possible to the original intention of 
the donor." See Chevalier-Watts, above n 13, at ch 8 referring to St John of the God Health & Elder Care 
Services Trust Board v Little Sisters of the Poor (NZ) Trust Board HC Napier CIV-2007-441-628, 11 
August 2008 at [20]. 
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far at the law permits.64 As a result "[t]he natural association of religion and charity meant that 
whether the public would benefit from the maintenance of non-conformist clergymen was simply 
not considered".65 This suggests then that it was the natural association of religion and charity that 
enabled the trust to be regarded as charitable.66 
Another example given by Harding is that of Da Costa v Da Paz, where the testator bequeathed 
some money for the support of Jesuba to instruct youth in the Jewish religion. This trust was also 
struck down for superstitious use, but it was argued that Lord Harwick would not have struck it 
down if Judaism had been tolerated in English law at the time.67 Thus this view is "best understood 
as resting on a natural association of religion and charity".68 
Whilst it is submitted that these early examples do not demonstrate any presumption of public 
benefit, the natural association of charity and religion actually performs a similar role to that of the 
presumption in contemporary cases. 69  This enabled courts to recognise religious purposes as 
charitable without "requiring evidence on the basis of which such a favourable view might be 
justified".70 
So in more modern times, with regard to the advancement of religion, any religion has 
invariably been presumed to be inherently beneficial because "any religion is at least likely to be 
better than none".71 Therefore the suggestion being that the presumption of public benefit was likely 
only to be rebutted in extreme circumstances where the beliefs or doctrines of the said religion 
would be "adverse to the very foundations of all religion, and that they are subversive of all 
morality". 72 Indeed the case of Thornton v Howe reflects this judicial affirmation of religious 
tolerance.73  
  
64  Harding, above n 62, at 161. 
65  At 161. 
66  At 161; and Juliet Chevalier-Watts "Trusts for Religious Purposes: Earthly Tests and Ethereal Matters" 
[2010] NZLJ 55 at 56. 
67  Harding, above n 62, at 161–162 referring to Da Costa v Da Paz (1754) 1 Dickens 259, 21 ER 268. 
68  At 162. See also Cary v Abbott (1802) 7 Ves Jun 490. 
69  Harding, above n 62, at 161–162; and Chevalier-Watts, above n 66, at 56. 
70  Harding, above n 62, at 163. 
71  Neville Estates v Madden [1962] Ch 832 at 853 as cited in Smith, above n 47, at 63. 
72  Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beavan 14 (Ch) at 20, 54 ER 1042 at 1044 as cited in Smith, above n 47, at 63 
and approved in Re Watson, above n 47, at 1478–1479. 
73  Hubert Picarda "Thornton v Howe: A Sound Principle or a Seminal Case past its best buy date?" (2013) 16 
CL & PR 91. 
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The case of Thornton concerned the printing and propagating of the sacred writings of Joanna 
Southcote, who:74 
… laboured under the delusion that she was to be made the medium of the miraculous birth of a child at 
an advanced period of her life, and that thereby the advancement of the Christian religion on earth 
would be occasioned. 
The plaintiff claimed that these beliefs were blasphemous or profane in character.75  Sir John 
Romilly MR, believed that "she was a foolish, ignorant woman, of an enthusiastic turn of mind, who 
had long wished to become an instrument in the hands of God to promote some great good on 
earth",76 however there was nothing in her writings that "could shake the faith of any sincere 
Christian".77 Her writings were largely "incoherent and confused",78 but they were clearly written 
with "a view to extend the influence of Christianity".79 This case might be an example of judicial 
affirmation of religious tolerance, and it certainly falls within the notion that a religious trust should 
only be rebutted in extreme circumstances where the beliefs or doctrines of the said religion would 
be "adverse to the very foundations of all religion, and that they are subversive of all morality".80 
However, it has also been said of this case that it has been "held up as setting the bar extremely low 
in determining whether a charity is for the advancement of religion".81 Further, there is argument 
that the presumption of public benefit determined the outcome of this case because it would appear 
that the evidence actually weighed against making a finding of public benefit.82 Indeed it appears to 
be difficult to reconcile such a decision in the absence of the presumption when the Court was able 
to find "as a matter of fact, that the public would benefit by the dissemination of beliefs" with so 
little foundation.83 However, because there was no explicit mention of public benefit in this case, it 
is "ultimately a matter of supposition whether or not such a presumption was applied".84 
  
74  Thornton v Howe, above n 72, at 20. 
75  At 15. 
76  At 18. 
77  At 20. 
78  At 20. 
79  At 21. 
80  At 20, as cited in Smith, above n 47, at 63 and approved in Re Watson, above n 72. 
81  Picarda, above n 73, at 91. 
82  Harding, above n 62, at 165. 
83  At 165. 
84  At 165. 
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This early judicial exploration in to the advancement of religion highlights the issues of finding 
a religious purpose charitable when the evidence points to the contrary, and certainly Sir John 
Romilly's "tolerant stance of legal neutrality towards religion has been questioned" because he did 
not expressly require that the trust convey any public benefit.85 Nonetheless, it could be argued that 
the presumption of public benefit obviated the need to "base findings of public benefit on evidence 
presented to the court".86  
However, the general inconsistencies of the consideration of the presumption of public benefit 
are highlighted in case of Cocks v Manners, heard but a few short years after Thornton.87 It does 
appear to reflect the notion that Thornton did perhaps set the bar extremely low regarding the 
advancement of religion and if the presumption of public benefit was a matter of supposition in 
Thornton, then it certainly was not in Cocks. 
In this case, the testatrix left a gift to an institution consisting of Roman Catholic women living 
together by mutual agreement in a state of celibacy for the purposes of sanctifying their own souls 
through prayer and pious contemplation. Sir John Wickens stated:88 
It is said, in some of the cases, that religious purposes are charitable, but that can only be true as to 
religious services tending directly or indirectly towards the instruction or the edification of the public.  
This is directly in contrast with that of the Court in Thornton where no mention of the presumption 
of public benefit was made, and indeed, his Lordship asserted that:89 
… an annuity to an individual, so long as he spent his time in retirement and constant devotion, would 
not be charitable, nor would a gift to ten persons, so long as they lived together in retirement and 
performed acts of devotion, be charitable. 
Therefore, his Lordship concluded that:90 
A voluntary association of women for the purpose of working out their own salvation by religious 
exercises and self-denial seems to me to have none of the requisites of a charitable institution, whether 
the word "charitable" is used in its popular sense or in its legal sense.  
  
85  Pauline Ridge "Legal Neutrality, Public Benefit and Religious Charitable Purposes: Making Sense of 
Thornton v Howe" (2010) 31 JLH 177 at 199. 
86  Harding, above n 62, at 166. 
87  Cocks v Manners, above n 42. 
88  At 585. 
89  At 585. 
90  At 585. 
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As a result, his Lordship stated that the gift to the convent was not charitable.91 There was no 
evidence however that this gift was "adverse to the very foundations of all religion, and that [it] was 
subversive of all morality",92 which reflects the disparity of the utilisation of the presumption to find 
public benefit, especially when the decisions were so close to each other in terms of time. However, 
it is not suggested that either were wrongly decided. Legal neutrality, as exemplified in Thornton, 
may have merely been a reflection of earlier legislative endorsement of religious tolerance, holding 
that religious purposes were generally charitable. If that is so, then Cocks could simply be a 
reflection of the growing realisation that not all religious purposes are charitable,93 therefore the 
utilisation of the presumption of public benefit was a tool to evaluate more stringently such 
purposes. Whilst however Cocks may then have been a watershed in the jurisprudence of religious 
purposes and public benefit, and may be reconcilable with Thornton, this argument is not entirely 
clear cut, and indeed, the case of Hobbs v Smith (Watson) has added fuel to the fire that the 
presumption of public benefit is rather an unwieldy judicial tool.94 
In this case, the testatrix made provision for the publication and public dissemination of the 
religious writings of HG Hobbs. Evidence by an expert was presented to the Court that these 
writings were of nil intrinsic worth and would not extend the knowledge of Christian religion. 
However, Plowman J concluded that Thornton provided the relevant approach. In other words, a 
court should not draw a distinction between one religion and another, and thus the only way of 
disproving a public benefit is to show that the doctrines are "adverse to the very foundations of all 
religion, and that they are subversive of all morality". 95  Therefore the evidence presented to 
Plowman J did not rebut the presumption of public benefit, even though the expert stated that there 
was no value to the writings and they would not extend the Christian religion! Thus Thornton and 
Watson suggest that the presumption of public benefit will only be rebutted in extreme 
circumstances but Cocks does not appear to present such an extreme circumstance, and neither does 
the later case of Gilmour v Coats, where again a gift to cloistered nuns was rejected as being 
charitable because the public benefit was not found.96 Thus whilst the presumption of public benefit 
has been historically easy to express, its application has not necessarily been historically consistent 
in England and Wales.  
  
91  At 585. 
92  Thornton v Howe, above n 72, at 20. 
93  Ridge, above n 85, at 201. 
94  Hobbs v Smith [1973] 1 WLR 1472 (Ch). 
95  Thorton v Howe, above n 72, at 20 as cited in Hobbs v Smith, above n 94, at 1478–1483. 
96  Gilmour v Coats, above n 48. 
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Of course, New Zealand's case law has much in common with the United Kingdom and like its 
commonwealth cousin, New Zealand also appears to reflect inconsistencies with the application of 
the presumption of public benefit. 
V NEW ZEALAND AND THE PRESUMPTION OF PUBLIC 
BENEFIT 
In the case of Presbyterian Church of New Zealand Beneficiary Fund v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue, the Presbyterian Church created a fund for the benefit of retired ministers, with the 
primary benefit of the fund being an annuity payable to retiring ministers.97 The Court had to 
determine whether there was sufficient public benefit for this fund to be charitable. Interestingly, the 
Court did not refer to the presumption of public benefit, even though it is firmly established under 
this head of charity, because the public benefit is "presumed unless there are grounds for holding 
otherwise".98 This immediately reflects an inequality of the recognition of this principle, and it 
suggests that the presumption of public benefit, at least in this case, was not recognised, which is 
curious.  
However, whilst the Court did not explicitly refer to this presumption, it did address the matter 
of public benefit, and asserted that the fund's objectives were to protect its ministers. In other words, 
the fund would provide them with sufficient income throughout their life "in accordance with the 
mutual commitment of Church and minister to a lifelong undertaking".99 Therefore it was this close 
connection between the Church, the fund and its ministers that demonstrated the requisite public 
benefit because "where the overall purpose goes to the benefit of persons who are demonstrably part 
of the structural workings of the Church overall", the public benefit is clear.100  
Heron J was of the view that the private benefits to members who received the fund were for the 
charitable purpose; in other words, the fund was essentially charitably altruistic in purpose,101 thus 
the private benefits were ancillary to the public benefits. The justification for this finding was that 
the retired ministers who received the benefit of the fund were "an integral part of the structure and 
workings of the Church and without them the Church would cease to exist". 102  In addition, 
  
97  Presbyterian Church of New Zealand Beneficiary Fund v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1994] 3 NZLR 
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ministers would not have been induced to take up their calling without the assurance of such 
financial security.  
This case therefore demonstrates that whilst it is established law that presumption of public 
benefit exists in New Zealand law, a court may still not explicitly recognise its applicability, 
although even without its acknowledgement, a court can still find that the public benefit is expressed 
sufficiently. This is evident even in controversial circumstances such as the instant case where, at 
first sight, it appears that beneficiaries receive generous private benefits. Indeed, the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal in Hester v Commissioner of Inland Revenue believed that Presbyterian Church 
was "at the outermost limits of this doctrine".103 
As with the Presbyterian Church, the Court in Hester also did not acknowledge the presumption 
of public benefit, even though in the context of the advancement of religion, it should be 
presumed.104 The Court of Appeal in Hester had to determine whether a superannuation plan that 
provided benefits for employees of the Church of Latter Day Saints was for a charitable purpose and 
therefore income tax exempt. The Court referred at length to the Presbyterian Church case, but in 
the end determined that whilst superannuation type schemes had a dominant purpose of providing 
for ministers and their families and thus had charitable purpose, the scheme in Hester was "well 
beyond the existing doctrine for an allowable charitable trust" because it was too broadly conceived 
as to those who may come within it.105 In other words, it may be possible for gardeners, clerical 
workers or cafeteria workers who work within the Temple building to come within the rubric, and 
that, in Hammond J's view "simply goes too far".106 
Whilst the New Zealand courts in Presbyterian Church and Hester may not have acknowledged 
the presumption of public benefit in relation to the advancement of religion, even though it is an 
established principle, the opposite can be said to be true for the recent case of Liberty Trust v 
Charities Commission.107 Liberty Trust was registered as a charitable entity in 2007 under the New 
Zealand Charities Act 2005. Its main activity is to act as a mortgage lending scheme, making 
interest free loans to donors and other people. The scheme is funded mainly by donations. Its 
lending scheme prompted the Charities Commission (now the Department of Internal Affairs – 
  
103  Hester v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2005] 2 NZLR 172 (CA) at [11]. 
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Charities)108 to remove the Trust from the Charities Register, which let to Liberty Trust appealing 
the decision to the High Court. 
The organisation stated that its lending scheme advanced religion by demonstrating practical 
financial lessons derived from the Bible. The Charities Commission, however, stated that "teaching 
financial principles derived from the Bible was at best conducive to religion but did not advance 
religion".109 The Commission asserted, inter alia, "that the Trust's emphasis was not on propagating 
the Christian doctrine, but rather on educating people through biblical financial principles, which 
included savings, spending and charitable giving".110 As a result, this would preclude the Trust from 
falling under the definition of "advancing religion".111 In asserting this, the Commission relied on 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne v Lawlor as authority "for the proposition that teaching 
biblical financial principles would merely be conducive to religion as opposed to actually advancing 
religion".112 
The main issue in Lawlor was whether the establishment of a Catholic newspaper could advance 
religion for charitable purposes. The Court acknowledged that, for it to be a newspaper, it obviously 
would contain "news" and this is likely to be secular in nature, but questioned whether:113  
… the Catholic Church [would] be any the less engaged in disseminating its religious doctrines and 
teachings merely because it chose to reach the public by supplying daily information and news, the main 
object throughout being the propagation of the faith?  
Returning then to the Liberty Trust case, Mallon J preferred the approach of the three judges in 
Lawlor, Gavan Duffy CJ, Evatt and McTiernan JJ, who adopted a broad view of how religion may 
be advanced. Gavan Duffy CJ and Evatt J noted that they were:114 
… quite unable to see the difference between the Catholic Church's propagating its religious tenets and 
regulating the performance of religious duties (1) through a medium reaching into the homes of the 
multitude, including Catholics and non-Catholics, and (2) through the ordinary medium of sermons and 
tracts. The former may be as much a method of preaching the gospel as the more direct and obvious 
method of strengthening or extending faith through missions and sermons. 
  
108  The Charities Commission of New Zealand was abolished in 2012 and its regulatory functions transferred to 
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It is submitted that this is certainly the correct approach to take "because it acknowledges the 
advancements in society regarding religious instruction and its dissemination".115 "It is not such a 
great step to recognise that religion may be advanced through a religious newspaper, so long as the 
dominant purpose of that newspaper is to instruct those of that religion in 'matters of faith and 
morals and of advancing and spreading the faith and teachings'".116  
In addition, Liberty Trust teaches budgeting and financial matters as part of the "Word of God" 
so even though secular information is being disseminated, the organisation maintains the religious 
doctrines upon which the teachings rest, and promotes and manifests those tenets.117 "Therefore the 
biblical financial principles as taught by the Liberty Trust 'are an aspect of Christian Faith as 
expounded by Liberty Trust.'" 118  Whilst this case strengthens the position that religious 
organisations may undertake secular activities so long as in doing so they pursue an outworking of 
their religion, it goes further. It also highlights that the further the secular activities are from 
religion, the more difficult it is to sustain the idea that the organisation is pursuing religious 
purposes,119 which then may rebut the presumption of public benefit.  
Mallon J affirmed that applicability of the presumption of public benefit in New Zealand in the 
Liberty Trust case. This means that:120 
Although the starting point is this presumption/assumption, it remains for the court to be satisﬁed that 
the gift satisﬁes the public beneﬁt requirement. Tudor says that it "is considered that the presumption 
will be rebutted, and the public beneﬁt will have to be shown positively, if there is evidence that the 
purpose is subversive of all morality, or it is a new belief system, or if there has been public concern 
expressed about the organisation carrying out the particular purpose, or if it is focused too narrowly on 
its adherents. 
Therefore it is still possible for a Court to be dissuaded of an organisation's public benefit. 
Mallon J provided an extension of Thorton's method of rebutting the public benefit, which reflects a 
broadening of the Court's jurisdiction to determine this benefit. However, whilst this prima facie 
suggests that rebutting the presumption may occur in a greater number of situations than first 
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expressed or conceived in Thornton, the reality in Liberty Trust is that, in New Zealand at least, 
public benefit may be construed very broadly indeed. 
Mallon J affirmed that because she had found that the purposes of the trust advanced religion, 
then the presumption in the instant case was to assume that the public benefit was conferred, and 
that this assumption would not be displaced merely because a court may have a different view of the 
social utility of the scheme. The scheme was not proven to be contrary to public policy, nor was it 
contrary to any Christian or Biblical principles.121 However, it is submitted that the scheme did fall 
foul of Tudor's proposition that the presumption may be rebutted if the purpose were to be "focused 
too narrowly on its adherents".122 
The Charities Commission argued that the private benefits afforded to recipients of the lending 
scheme to pay off long term debts so that "they can be free to fulfil God's call upon their lives" 
outweighed the purported public benefits.123 In response, Mallon J stated:124 
Liberty Trust is not merely a lending scheme set up to provide private beneﬁts to its members. 
Membership is not restricted – it is open to all regardless of faith. For those who join, it is in part 
intended to provide private beneﬁts, namely to assist with house ownership free of the shackles of 
interest incurring debt … but those private beneﬁts are seen as part of living as a Christian. An integral 
part of the scheme is that its beneﬁts are to be shared with others. 
Therefore it was asserted categorically that "private benefit is part and parcel of Christian living".125 
This may be so, "but beyond that there must be an overall purpose of public benefit: the private 
benefit should be ancillary to the public benefit".126 Liberty Trust desired that loanees should be 
able to live debt free so that they could fulfil God's call, although it is not determined how this 
should be achieved, and whilst this is commendable, it is merely a hope, "and case law is clear that a 
mere hope does not equate to a charitable purpose".127  
Mallon J did note that she found it "difficult to distinguish [the scheme] from a mass in a Church 
which is open to the public",128 but it is respectfully submitted "that a mortgage scheme established 
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to relieve private financial impecuniosities with a connection to the Christian faith may be 
distinguished from public prayers whose prime purpose is to propagate the Christian faith, because 
the benefits of the loan scheme are too narrowly focused on its adherents".129 In other words, to 
repeat the words expressed in Tudor, it "is considered that the presumption will be rebutted … if it is 
focused too narrowly on its adherents".130 
As was so eloquently stated by her Honour, the scheme was about being able to "lead a 
Christian life free of the burdens of debt".131 Surely this primarily supports the notion of private 
benefit, and is thus "focused too narrowly on its adherents". This being so, the presumption of 
public benefit should then be rebutted. However, this was not what the Court determined, and 
instead, Mallon J found that the lending scheme was a religious one, albeit a scheme that offered 
private benefits.132 As O'Halloran states:133 
Arguably there is a line to be drawn between the outworkings of a religious faith that, being ancillary 
and incidental in nature, can be seen to manifest an organisation's religious beliefs, and those that are 
disproportionate and unrelated to such an organisation and its beliefs.  
I respectfully assert that that line has been crossed in the Liberty Trust case where I would argue that 
the purpose of the scheme is to relieve financial burdens with a hope that the principles of the 
Christian faith are to be expounded as a result of that relief.134 The focus is on the adherents first 
and foremost, which should theoretically rebut the presumption of public benefit because it appears 
too remote. 
Case law in New Zealand therefore, much like case law in England and Wales, reflects a level of 
uncertainty in relation to the presumption of public benefit. Whilst the contemporary case of Liberty 
Trust does indeed affirm the presumption itself, its conclusions may be subject to some criticism,135 
and suggests that the presumption itself is not rebuttable even when evidence is presented that 
arguably should rebut the presumption, and perhaps even that it is not "readily evident what 
evidence will rebut that presumption".136 
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What then is the answer for New Zealand with regard to these difficulties? Perhaps the answer 
may be found in the United Kingdom's statutory removal of the presumption of public benefit as per 
the Charities Act 2011 (UK). 
VI REMOVING THE PRESUMPTION OF ADVANCEMENT – THE 
ANSWER TO OUR PRAYERS? 
The Charities Act 2006 (UK) received Royal Assent in November 2006 and came fully into 
force in April 2008. Its main thrust was to increase the powers of the Charity Commission to protect 
charities and the duties of the charities to account to the public. The new Act also removed the 
presumption of public benefit, meaning that all charities, new and existing, will have to satisfy the 
public benefit test.137  The Charities Act 2011 (UK) came into effect on 14 March 2012 and 
consolidated the 2006 Act. Therefore religious groups or purposes will have to establish on their 
own specific merits that they do confer a public benefit, meaning that the following is no longer 
applicable: "the advancement of religion in a general sense is inherently beneficial because English 
law 'assumes that it is good for man to have and practice a religion'".138 
The idea of the removal of the presumption was to introduce "a uniform and consistent approach 
to the operation of the public benefit requirement across all the heads of charity".139 The Charity 
Commission stated that organisations should now demonstrate "factual and positive evidence" of 
such public benefit in the way in which its purposes are carried out.140 This, prima facie, sounds like 
a logical step, because, as this article has already demonstrated, the presumption of public benefit is 
inconsistently addressed or even applied. However, the consequences of removing such a 
presumption may be far reaching, and as a result, may not be the panacea that New Zealand might 
seek. For instance:141 
… it becomes necessary to question whether the provision does, in fact, change the law … or whether it 
merely affirms the previous case law. If it is the case either that no presumption did exist or that it was 
not applied previously, then precedent should be unaffected. Even if a presumption did exist and was 
applied, it might still be argued that the provision did not change the law of evidence, so that the court's 
ability and willingness to make assumptions and to make findings of fact without inquiry is unaffected. 
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Certainly evidence does point to the presumption existing, but as this article demonstrates, a 
court's ability to test that presumption, or even acknowledge it, can lead to anomalous results, 
therefore its removal may lead to equally anomalous results. 
The Charity Commission has published guidelines regarding public benefit but these guidelines 
do not overcome difficulties associated with establishing the public benefit of intangible benefits 
such as spiritual enlightenment and development, which inevitably are closely associated with 
religion. Spiritual benefits, by their very nature, are not quantifiable nor measurable in any 
meaningful way, therefore "spiritual benefit, though it is central to a religion's belief that such a 
benefit accrues to society, remains an enigmatic factor".142 How then shall the Charity Commission 
in England and Wales judge the public benefit from spiritual endeavours? 
Moral improvement cases have found favour with the courts in the past, for instance, in the case 
of Re Wedgewood, 143  which concerned a facility to slaughter animals, and was found to be 
charitable because this gift "tends to promote public morality by checking the innate tendency to 
cruelty". 144  This approach might then be utilised by the courts to determine intangible moral 
improvements in society through religious purposes, but Harding argues that moral improvement 
cases have not been firmly established in case law, 145  and further, it is arguable that moral 
improvement cases may rest on the assumption that many people would accept that carrying out 
such a purpose would bring about moral improvement.146 There is no evidence to suggest that most 
people would accept the proposition that a purpose might improve morals, and lack of evidence 
does not make that assumption correct. Indeed, Harding asserts that in the moral improvement cases, 
the courts have not had the benefit of such evidence. So to make such an assumption is actually to 
apply a presumption of public benefit, which the United Kingdom cannot now do.147 Therefore:148 
… such an assumption seems singularly inappropriate in a modern case on a trust for religious purposes; 
in a community characterised by religious diversity, it cannot be assumed that most people accept any 
given proposition about the intangible public benefit that will flow from carrying out a religious 
purpose. 
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Indeed, "there is to be no presumption that religion generally is for the public benefit",149 and 
that means that, for instance, there is no presumption that "Christianity or Islam are for the public 
benefit and no presumption that the Church of England is for the public benefit".150 
It is evident then that whilst the public benefit of religious purposes will have to be assessed in 
the United Kingdom, it is not clear how this will be undertaken and against what criteria.  
Previously, the fundamental position in religious purpose cases has been that all religious 
charities should be treated equally and "the law of charity does not now favour one religion to 
another".151 Yet, the Charities Act 2006 (UK) means that value judgements may have to be made, 
but whose values and whose judgements? With such value judgements come an element of 
subjectivity, which in turn leads to uncertainty, and uncertainty was one issue that the removal of 
the presumption of public benefit sought to eradicate. The burden of proof now rests with the charity 
to establish the public benefit and that being so, this then suggests that such cases as Thornton and 
Watson may be decided differently if being judged in a contemporary context because on the 
evidence neither case "had much merit and their intrinsic value was minimal".152  
Further issues pertaining to public benefit may arise in relation to where the balance lies as to 
the benefit and harm of a set of religious beliefs as well as to whether certain doctrines amount to 
benefit or to harm, for instance, the prohibition of the use of modern technology.153 So whilst the 
Charities Act 2006 (UK) "raises the importance of public benefit",154 it also raises issues with 
regard to the requirement of proof of public benefit. 
Perhaps then the removal of the presumption of public benefit is not necessarily the answer for 
New Zealand because in reality, whilst the presumption of public benefit can certainly be viewed as 
a nebulous and intangible concept, the concept of establishing public benefit for religious purposes 
is equally riddled with issues. Religious purposes are, generally, by their very nature, intangible and 
therefore presuming their benefit is a useful tool that relieves the courts of having to make 
potentially subjective judgement calls as to the moral and spiritual benefits of religious purposes. 
New Zealand has certainly gone some way to reaffirming the concept of the presumption in the case 
of Liberty Trust, and that should be welcomed, although this case presented as a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, the case provided much needed certainty that the presumption of public 
benefit was still a very important consideration in the law of New Zealand. On the other, it has been 
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argued that there was evidence to rebut the presumption, but this did not occur, suggesting then an 
overly broad interpretation of public benefit when there appeared to be sufficient evidence of private 
benefits that were not ancillary to the overall charitable purpose. Nonetheless, whilst the Liberty 
Trust decision does not satisfy the need for consistency and certainty in the application of the 
presumption of public benefit, it is useful because it affirms the value of the presumption as a tool in 
the judicial armoury regarding religious purposes, which is now perhaps lacking in the United 
Kingdom since the removal of this presumption.   
VII CONCLUSION 
"The concept of public benefit is intangible and nebulous; its effects can only be represented as 
variable and unpredictable, sometimes impossible to reconcile."155 Unfortunately, even some five 
decades after this statement was made, "confusion still reigns in this area of law",156 and that 
certainly applies equally to the presumption of public benefit. As this article reflects, the United 
Kingdom has sought to provide certainty in this matter by removing the presumption of public 
benefit through the Charities Act 2006, and surely there is indeed a need for certainty and 
consistency. However, the removal of this presumption has not necessarily provided those hoped for 
benefits, at least with regard to the advancement of religion. Issues remain when the public benefit 
is related to spiritual enlightenment or spiritual development, where such benefits cannot be 
measured in any meaningful way. Indeed, the evaluation of such public benefit:157 
… is not merely so impractical as to be effectively impossible … but genuinely impossible: no advances 
in technology or information-gathering will ever enable the meaningful evaluation of something 
fundamentally incapable of evaluation. 
It is clear that there have been, and continue to be, inherent difficulties with the presumption of 
public benefit. New Zealand has not sought to remove this presumption, although there will 
certainly be a review of the Charities Act 2005, and charitable purpose, which then raises the 
question as to whether New Zealand should follow in the footsteps of its commonwealth cousin. 
This article suggests that whilst New Zealand law also reflects judicial inconsistencies with the 
application of the presumption of public benefit, it is not clear that removing that presumption 
would be helpful. The author suggests that with the removal of the presumption of public benefit, it 
could be argued that this removed a useful tool by which the courts could evaluate public benefit. 
Public benefit and religion are inherently linked but with no meaningful method of evaluating that 
benefit, so perhaps presuming the public benefit is actually the most pragmatic method of 
approaching this issue. The contemporary New Zealand case of Liberty Trust reflects the Court's 
  
155  Peter Luxton The Law of Charities (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) at 171 as cited in Iwobi, above 
n 4, at 631. 
156  Iwobi, above n 4, at 631. 
157  Jonathan Garton Public Benefit in Charity Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) at 110. 
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desire to acknowledge that public benefit, even in the face of evidence that the benefit could have 
been rebutted. The public benefit of religion cannot be measured and this case reflects the reality of 
that. 
Regardless of the growing atheist and secular movements, religion still remains the foundation 
of many contemporary societies and the inherent inability to judge the public value of religion 
surely suggests that the test of public benefit should be cast as widely as possible, or even simply 
presumed so as to reflect the realities of belief systems.  
The courts' rejection of spiritual benefit both undermines the very nature of what it means to be religious 
and flies in the face of the importance, albeit archaic, attributed to spiritual matters elsewhere in charity 
law.158 
Therefore it is respectfully asserted that the removal of the presumption of public benefit is not 
the answer for New Zealand. Certainly there is a need for certainty and consistency when it comes 
to the consideration of public benefit and the advancement of religion, but it is not clear how 
removing that presumption really does assist a court when it comes to ascertaining the real public 
value, and thus benefit to a community, of the advancement of religion.  
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